EA-relatable quotes

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  • “Suppose there were discovered relicted populations in the forests of Africa between humans and chimpanzees. What would we do, what would those speciesists do, if a live specimen of Lucy (Australopithecus afarensis) were to be discovered? It’s a pure accident that they’re extinct. We ought to do be able to do something about our morals and our ethics taking account of the fact that they might not have been extinct. This major ethical distinction should not depend upon the mere accident of extinction.”

    — Richard Dawkins in Speciesism: The Movie (2013)

  • “If a curiously selective plague came along and killed all people of intermediate height, ‘tall’ and ‘short’ would come to have just as precise a meaning as ‘bird’ or ‘mammal’. The same is true of human ethics and law. Our legal and moral systems are deeply species-bound. The director of a zoo is legally entitled to ‘put down’ a chimpanzee that is surplus to requirements, while any suggestion that he might ‘put down’ a redundant keeper or ticket-seller would be greeted with howls of incredulous outrage. The chimpanzee is the property of the zoo. Humans are nowadays not supposed to be anybody’s property, yet the rationale for discriminating against chimpanzees in this way is seldom spelled out, and I doubt if there is a defensible rationale at all. Such is the breathtaking speciesism of our attitudes, the abortion of a single human zygote can arouse more moral solicitude and righteous indignation than the vivisection of any number of intelligent adult chimpanzees! [T]he only reason we can be comfortable with such a double standard is that the intermediates between humans and chimps are all dead.”

    — Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without Design

  • “[T]hink about something like the raging debate about abortion. People get very, very hot under the collar about killing a tiny, few celled embryo because it’s human. Whereas this tiny, little human embryo is far less capable of feeling pain, of feeling fear, of feeling hurt certainly than an adult pig or cow. And there’s virtually no difference between a human embryo and a cow embryo or a pig embryo.”

    — Richard Dawkins, interview and Q&A in Greece (April 26, 2015)

  • “Could we call a mass killing of Neanderthals a genocide? What about a mass killing of Homo erectus? What about Australopithecus? What about chimpanzees? When does it stop being a genocide? The idea that the distinction between humans and non-humans is based on science and reason is a farce. It’s as morally arbitrary and unscientific as discrimination based on race, gender, and sexual orientation.”

    — Jay Shooster

  • “Why [s]hould the boundary of sacrosanct life match the boundary of our species?”

    — Peter Singer, Practical Ethics

  • “We live in a speciesist society, all of us do. We regard humans as being ultra-special, such that cannibalism is an absolute, total no-no. And yet if you think about the fact that we all are evolved beings, we are cousins of all living creatures, if by any chance the intermediates between humans and other species we’re all living still (they just happen to be extinct, but if they weren’t), we would they have to decide does this one count as human, can we eat that one or is that one too human? As it happens, we don’t have to face this dilemma because the intermediates are all extinct, therefore we [are biased towards being] speciesist.”

    — Richard Dawkins, interview and Q&A in Greece (April 26, 2015)

  • “Tens of billions of [non-human animals] have been subjected over the last two centuries to a regime of industrial exploitation, whose cruelty has no precedent in the annals of planet Earth. If we accept a mere tenth of what animal-rights activists are claiming, then modern industrial agriculture might well be the greatest crime in history.”

    — Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens (2014)

  • “Nothing invests life with more meaning than the realisation that every moment of sentience is a precious gift.”

    — Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature

  • “I intervene to reduce suffering, regardless of whether it’s natural or not.”

    — unknown

  • “Suppose we’re 90% confident that all generations have equal moral value, and believe there’s a 10% chance that only the current generation matters. (There are other possibilities but let’s narrow it down to these two for simplicity’s sake.) There’s no agreed-upon method for handling this kind of moral uncertainty, but let’s say we handle it by assigning resources to each moral system in proportion to our confidence in it and then let each system “buy” what it wants. So if we have $1 million, we give $900,000 to our first moral system which says that all generations have equal moral value, and $100,000 to our second system which only values the current generation. Then each system can use the money on whatever intervention it believes is best, or they can trade with each other.”

    — Michael Dickens, How Should a Large Donor Prioritize Cause Areas?

  • “To argue from ‘we don’t understand the cognitive basis for consciousness’ to ‘it’s OK to eat non-humans’ is acting as though our ignorance were positive knowledge we could confidently set down our weight on. Even if you have a specific cognitive model that predicts ‘there’s an 80% chance cattle can’t suffer,’ you have to be just as cautious as you’d be about torturing a 20%-likely-to-be-conscious person in a non-vegetative coma, or a 20%-likely-to-be-conscious alien.”

    — Rob Bensinger, Inhuman altruism: Inferential gap, or motivational gap?

  • “Confidence about animal psychology (in the direction of ‘it’s relevantly human-like’) and extreme uncertainty about animal psychology can both justify prioritizing animal welfare; but when you’re primarily accustomed to seeing uncertainty about animal psychology used as a rationalization for neglecting animals, it will take increasing amounts of effort to keep the policy proposal and the question-of-fact mentally distinct.”

    — Rob Bensinger, Inhuman altruism: Inferential gap, or motivational gap?

  • “‘Humanity’ does not exist. There are only humans, driven by conflicting needs and illusions, and subject to every kind of infirmity of will and judgement.”

    — John Gray, Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals (2002), p. 12

  • “Every individual is an exception to the rule.”

    — Carl Jung

  • “The antispeciesist claims that, other things being equal, conscious beings of equivalent sentience deserve equal care and respect.”

    — David Pearce, The Antispeciesist Revolution (Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, 2013)

  • “A true friend of mankind whose heart has but once quivered in compassion over the sufferings of the people, will understand and forgive all the impassable alluvial filth in which they are submerged, and will be able to discover the diamonds in the filth.”

    — Fyodor Dostoyevsky

  • “It is surprising to see such a warm, mushy idea – brotherly love – grow out of a word as cold and clinical as “utilitarianism”. But it shouldn’t be. Brotherly love is implicit in the standard formulations of utilitarianism – maximum total happiness, the greatest good for the greatest number. In other words: everyone’s happiness counts equally; you are not privileged, and you shouldn’t act as if you are.”

    — Robert Wright, The Moral Animal: Why We Are, the Way We Are: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology (1994), p. 336

  • “That’s one of the great things about utilitarianism, actually: It’s a form of unconditional love. No matter who the organism is or what he/she has done, his/her happiness and suffering still count just the same.”

    — Brian Tomasik

  • “If the success or failure of this planet and of human beings depended on how I am and what I do, how would I be? What would I do?”

    — attributed to Buckminster Fuller

  • “We appear to have a tendency to consider smaller beings “less sentient” and less morally important than bigger ones. It somehow feels like a lobster is much more likely to be sentient than, say, an ant. However, this intuition is far from justified, since an ant brain actually has more than twice as many neurons than the brain of a lobster, while bees and cockroaches both have about ten times as many neurons as a lobster. So, when we think about insects and small beings in general, it is worth planting this flag in the front of our minds: we should not be swayed to believe that these beings matter less simply because they are small.”

    — Magnus Vinding, Speciesism: Why It Is Wrong, And The Implications of Rejecting It (2015)

  • “Nature, as we know, regards ultimately only fitness and not our happiness, and does not scruple to use hate, fear, punishment and even war alongside affection in ordering social groups and selecting among them, just as she uses pain as well as pleasure to get us to feed, water and protect our bodies and also in forging our social bonds.”

    — Leonard Katz, Toward Good and Evil

  • “Most people like to imagine that normal life is happy and that other states are abnormalities that need explanation. This is a pre-Darwinian view of psychology. We were not designed for happiness. Neither were we designed for unhappiness. Happiness is not a goal left unaccomplished by some bungling designer, it is an aspect of a behavioural regulation mechanism shaped by natural selection. The utter mindlessness of natural selection is terribly hard to grasp and even harder to accept. Natural selection gradually sifts variations in DNA sequences. Sequences that create phenotypes with a less-than-average reproductive success are displaced in the gene pool by those that give increased success. This process results in organisms that tend to want to stay alive, get resources, have sex, and take care of children. But these are not the goals of natural selection. Natural selection has no goals: it just mindlessly shapes mechanisms, including our capacities for happiness and unhappiness, that tend to lead to behavior that maximizes fitness. Happiness and unhappiness are not ends; they are means. They are aspects of mechanisms that influence us to act in the interests of our genes.”

    — Randolph Nesse, Natural Selection and the Elusiveness of Happiness (The Science of Well-Being, 2005, p. 10)

  • “Nature is the product of evolution, a blind, indifferent process that’s all about gene survival, not about the well-being of individuals.”

    — Lukas Gloor

  • “The blind forces of evolution do not optimize for happiness. The pain endured by a fish afflicted with parasites or a rat swallowed alive by a snake is no more tolerable than the “natural” suffering of humans due to malaria, cancer, or starvation. Both deserve our attention.”

    — Brian Tomasik

  • “[T]he world is a very dark place. While many moments of people’s lives are filled with laughter and accomplishment, some moments are filled with depression, anxiety, or extreme and unrelenting agony. And the lives of most non-human animals are far worse. It’s easy to become upset and hopeless: Why don’t other people care about extreme suffering? How can they not see how important it is compared with other, more trivial things in life?”

    — Brian Tomasik, Strategic Considerations for Moral Antinatalists (Essays on Reducing Suffering)

  • “Could it really be that sentient beings have died, absolutely, for millions of years. …with no soul and no afterlife… not as any grand plan of Nature, not to teach us about the meaning of life, not even to teach a profound lesson about what is impossible, but… just because? Dead forever, in a world beyond the reach of God.”

    — Eliezer Yudkowsky, Beyond the Reach of God (abridged by Raymond Arnold, Nate Soares)

  • “The view of Cosmic Pessimism is a strange mysticism of the world-without-us, a hermeticism of the abyss, a noumenal occultism. It is the difficult thought of the world as absolutely unhuman, and indifferent to the hopes, desires, and struggles of human individuals and groups. Its limit-thought is the idea of absolute nothingness, unconsciously represented in the many popular media images of nuclear war, natural disasters, global pandemics, and the cataclysmic effects of climate change. Certainly these are the images, or the specters, of Cosmic Pessimism, and different from the scientific, economic, and political realities and underlie them; but they are images deeply embedded in our psyche nonetheless. Beyond these specters there is the impossible thought of extinction, with not even a single human being to think the absence of all human beings, with no thought to think the negation of all thought.”

    — Eugene Thacker, In the Dust of This Planet: Horror of Philosophy, Volume 1, p. 17

  • “The most terrifying fact about the universe is not that it is hostile, but that it is indifferent – but if we can come to terms with this indifference, then our existence as a species can have genuine meaning. However vast the darkness, we must supply our own light.”

    — Stanley Kubrick

  • “Contrary to what you may assume, I am not a pessimist but an indifferentist – that is, I don’t make the mistake of thinking that the [cosmos] gives a damn one way or the the other about the especial wants and ultimate welfare of mosquitoes, rats, lice, dogs, men, horses, pterodactyls, trees, fungi, dodos, or other forms of biological energy.”

    — H. P. Lovecraft, letter to James F. Morton (1929)

  • “Whether we are based on carbon or silicon makes no fundamental difference. We should each be treated with appropriate respect.”

    — Dr. Chandra (2010)

  • “[I]t seems so unfair: some of us starve to death before we’re out of infancy, while others – by an accident of birth – live out their lives in opulence and splendour. We can be born into an abusive family or a reviled ethnic group, or start out with some deformity; we go through life with the deck stacked against us, and then we die, and that’s it? Nothing but a dreamless and endless sleep? Where’s the justice in this? This is stark and brutal and heartless.”

    — Carl Sagan, The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark (1995), p. 255

  • “Even just within our species, 150,000 persons are destroyed each day while countless more suffer an appalling array of torments and deprivations. Nature might be a great experimentalist, but one who would never pass muster with an ethics review board – contravening the Helsinki Declaration and every norm of moral decency, left, right, and center. It is important that we not gratuitously replicate such horrors in silico.”

    — Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Strategies and Dangers, Chapter 12: Acquiring Values (2014)

  • “The total amount of suffering per year in the natural world is beyond all decent contemplation. During the minute it takes me to compose this sentence, thousands of animals are being eaten alive; others are running for their lives, whimpering with fear; others are being slowly devoured from within by rasping parasites; thousands of all kinds are dying of starvation, thirst and disease. [T]he universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference.”

    — Richard Dawkins, River Out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, Chapter: God’s utility function (1995)

  • “Our job now is to prepare the ground for forthcoming generations to take action where we may be currently unable to act.”

    — Oscar Horta, Disvalue in Nature and Intervention (2010)

  • “[I]t is when we turn to their treatment of the non-human races that we find the surest evidences of barbarism; yet their savagery, even here, is not wholly “naked and unashamed,” for, strange to say, these curious people delight to mask their rudeness in a cloak of fallacies and sophisms, and to represent themselves as “lovers” of those very creatures whom they habitually torture for “sport,” science,” and the “table.” They actually have a law for the prevention of cruelty to animals, under which certain privileged species, classed as “domestic,” are protected from some specified wrongs, though all the time they may, under certain conditions, be subjected with impunity to other and worse injuries at the hands of the slaughterman or the vivisector; while the wild species, though presumably not less sensitive to pain, are regarded as almost entirely outside the pale of protection, and as legitimate subjects for those brutalities of “fashion” and “sport” which are characteristic of the savage mind.”

    — Henry Salt, Seventy Years among Savages (1921), p. 12

  • “It is arguable [t]hat a further effect of our partiality for members of our own species is a tendency to decreased sensitivity to the lives and well-being of those sentient beings that are not members of our species.

    One can discern an analogous phenomenon in the case of nationalism. It frequently happens that the sense of solidarity among the members of a nation motivates them to do for one another all that – and perhaps even more than – they are required to do by impartial considerations. But the powerful sense of collective identity within a nation is often achieved by contrasting an idealized conception of the national character with caricatures of other nations, whose members are regarded as less important or worthy or, in many cases, are dehumanized and despised as inferior or even odious. When nationalist solidarity is maintained. in this way – as it has been in recent years in such places as Yugoslavia and its former provinces – the result is often brutality and atrocity on an enormous scale. Thus, while nationalist sentiment may have beneficial effects within the nation, these are greatly outweighed from an impartial point of view by the dreadful effects that it has on relations between nations.

    I believe that our treatment of the severely retarded and our treatment of animals follow a similar pattern. While our sense of kinship with the severely retarded moves us to treat them with great solicitude, our perception of animals as radically “other” numbs our sensitivity to them, allowing us to abuse them in various ways with an untroubled conscience. We are not, of course, aggressively hostile to them the way nationalists often are to the members of rival nations; we are simply indifferent. But indifference to their lives and well-being is sufficient, when conjoined with motives of self-interest, for the flourishing of various practices that involve both killing and the infliction of suffering on a truly massive scale and that go virtually unchallenged in all contemporary human societies: factory farming, slaughtering animals for food or to take their furs, using them for the testing of cosmetic products, killing them for sport, and so on. When one compares the relatively small number of severely retarded human beings who benefit from our solicitude with the vast number of animals who suffer at our hands, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the good effects of our species-based partiality are greatly outweighed by the bad.”

    — Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (2002), p. 221

  • “Humans – who enslave, castrate, experiment on, and fillet other animals have had an understandable penchant for pretending that animals do not feel pain. On whether we should grant some modicum of rights to other animals, the philosopher Jeremy Bentham stressed that the question was not how smart they are, but how much torment they can feel. [F]rom all criteria available to us – the recognizable agony in the cries of wounded animals, for example, including those who usually utter hardly a sound – this question seems moot. The limbic system in the human brain, known to be responsible for much of the richness of our emotional life, is prominent throughout the mammals. The same drugs that alleviate suffering in humans mitigate the cries and other signs of pain in many other animals. It is unseemly of us, who often behave so unfeelingly toward other animals, to contend that only humans can suffer.”

    — Carl Sagan, Ann Druyan, Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors (1992), pp. 371-372

  • “Cannibalism is so repugnant to us that for years even anthropologists failed to admit that it was common in prehistory. It is easy to think: could other human beings really be capable of such a depraved act? But of course animal rights activists have a similarly low opinion of meat eaters, who not only cause millions of preventable deaths but do so with utter callousness: castrating and branding cattle without an anesthetic, impaling fish by the mouth and letting them suffocate in the hold of a boat, boiling lobsters alive. My point is not to make a moral case for vegetarianism but to shed light on the mindset of human violence and cruelty. History and ethnography suggest that people can treat strangers the way we now treat lobsters, and our incomprehension of such deeds may be compared with animal rights activists’ incomprehension of ours. It is no coincidence that Peter Singer, the author of The Expanding Circle, is also the author of Animal Liberation.”

    — Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature (2002), p. 320

  • “I would not question the sincerity of vegetarians who take little interest in Animal Liberation because they give priority to other causes; but when nonvegetarians say that “human problems come first” I cannot help wondering what exactly it is that they are doing for human beings that compels them to continue to support the wasteful, ruthless exploitation of farm animals.”

    — Peter Singer, Animal Liberation

  • “[T]he biology of consciousness offers a sounder basis for morality than the unprovable dogma of an immortal soul. It’s not just that an understanding of the physiology of consciousness will reduce human suffering through new treatments for pain and depression. That understanding can also force us to recognize the interests of other beings – the core of morality.

    [The] power to deny that other people have feelings is not just an academic exercise but an all-to-common vice, as we see in the long history of human cruelty. Yet once we realize that our own consciousness is a product of our brains and that other people have brains like ours, a denial of other people’s sentience becomes ludicrous. “Hath not a Jew eyes?” asked Shylock. Today the question is more pointed: Hath nor a Jew – or an Arab, or an African, or a baby, or a god–a cerebral cortex and a thalamus? The undeniable fact that we are all made of the same neural flesh makes it impossible to deny our common capacity to suffer.”

    — Steven Pinker, The Mystery of Consciousness (Time, January 19, 2007)

  • “Why did I feed these animals against all advice? Because we live in the same place, because they were individuals, because they had relatives, experience, a past, and desires, because they were cold and hungry, because they hadn’t found enough to eat in the fall, because each had just one life.”

    — Elizabeth Marshall Thomas

  • “You can’t imagine progressing towards a more altruistic society, a more compassionate society, while completely ignoring the suffering of animals.”

    — Matthieu Ricard

  • “As long as humans think that animals don’t feel, animals have to feel that humans don’t think.”

    — unknown

  • ”Quite rightly, we do not normally take the behaviour of animals as a model for how we may treat them. We would not, for example, justify tearing a cat to pieces because we had observed the cat tearing a mouse to pieces. Carnivorous fishes don’t have a choice about whether to kill other fish or not. They kill as a matter of instinct. Meanwhile, humans can choose to abstain from killing or eating fish and other animals. Alternatively, the argument could be made that is part of natural order that there are predators and prey, and so it cannot be wrong for us to play our part in this order. But this ‘argument from nature’ can justify all kinds of inequities, including the rule of men over women and leaving the weak and the sick to fall by the wayside.”

    — Peter Singer, The Ethics of What We Eat: Why Our Food Choices Matter

  • “People who accuse us of putting in too much violence, [should see] what we leave on the cutting-room floor.”

    — David Attenborough, speaking about his nature documentaries

  • “We slaughter 60 billion land animals each year, that’s 7 million every hour. Let’s imagine that mentioning this numbers was just a bad joke, and factory farming didn’t exist. Would you object [to] an increase in culinary diversity that required scientific experiments that killed 7 million animals per hour? How is factory farming different from that? Considering the victims, it seems that not helping to end factory farming is just as unethical as newly introducing it.”

    — Michael Moor, Impact through rationality (TEDxZurich, 2013)

  • “Granted that any practice causes more pain to animals than it gives pleasure to man; is that practice moral or immoral? And if, exactly in proportion as human beings raise their heads out of the slough of selfishness, they do not with one voice answer “immoral,” let the morality of the principle of utility be for ever condemned.”

    — John Stuart Mill, Whewell in Moral Philosophy

  • “Human beings are not the only creatures smart enough to suffer[.]”

    — Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), p. 449

  • “[A] full grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, a week, or even a month old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not ‘Can they reason?’ nor ‘Can they talk?’ but ‘Can they suffer?’”

    — Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789)

  • “The question [determining whether animals deserve ethical consideration] is not ‘Can they reason?’ nor ‘Can they talk?’ but ‘Can they suffer?’”

    — Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789)

  • “The racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of his own race, when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is the same in each case. [M]ost human beings are speciesists.”

    — Peter Singer

  • “As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same nation, though personally unknown to him. This point being once reached, there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to the men of all nations and races.”

    — Charles Darwin

  • “Somebody has to and no one else will.”

    — The Comet King, Unsong

  • “[John Rawls] nowhere suggests that wealthy nations ought to try to assist poor nations to meet the basic needs of their citizens, except in so far as this is part of a much broader project of helping those peoples to attain liberal or decent institutions. The probability that, in the real world in which we live, tens of millions will starve or die from easily preventable illnesses before such institutions are attained, is not something to which Rawls directs his attention.”

    — Peter Singer, Outsiders: Our Obligations to those beyond Our Borders (The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy, 2004, p. 26)

  • “Perhaps, as Kant thought, making transgressors suffer is a truly worthy goal, just for its own sake. But if that’s right, it’s a remarkable coincidence. How strange if the true principles of justice just happen to coincide with the feelings produced by our punishment gizmos, installed in our brains by natural selection to help us stabilize cooperation and thus make more copies of our genes. Knowing how our brains work and how they got here, it’s more reasonable to suppose that our taste for justice is a useful illusion.”

    — Joshua Greene, Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them (2013), p. 274

  • “[W]e can appeal to rights when moral matters have been settled. In other words, our appeals to rights may serve as shields, protecting our moral progress from the threats that remain. Likewise, there are times when it makes sense to use “rights” as weapons, as rhetorical tools for making moral progress when arguments have failed.”

    — Joshua Greene, Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them (2013), p. 308

  • “As a citizen, I have a duty to others because it’s not just me and my principles, but everybody. [I] have to consider how what I do will impact other people.”

    — Michael LaBossiere, Ethicists say voting with your heart, without a care about the consequences, is actually immoral (Quartz, June 26, 2016)

  • “[I]’m not going to let my principles condemn other people to suffering.”

    — Michael LaBossiere, Ethicists say voting with your heart, without a care about the consequences, is actually immoral (June 26, 2016)

  • “The purpose of voting is not to express your fidelity to a worldview. It’s not to wave a flag or paint your face in team colors; it’s to produce outcomes[.]”

    — Jason Brennan, Ethicists say voting with your heart, without a care about the consequences, is actually immoral (June 26, 2016)

  • “[There is a] genuine dilemma in the sense that [any decision] could result in undue harm… Seeing that there is no escaping this problem, and no magic test that can eliminate it, the only thing that can be done is try to minimise as much as possible the harmful consequences likely to follow from [our] decisions. [S]o we should balance the magnitude of the evil against the chances of its occurrence.”

    — Alan S. Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice (3rd Revised edition)

  • “The rule-bound or superstitious person may adhere to the rule for its own sake, but the rational person would not.”

    — Conrad Johnson, The Authority of the Moral Agent (Consequentialism and its Critics, 1988, p. 262

  • “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.”

    — John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p. 26

  • “I doubt [t]hat any fundamental ethical dispute between consequentialists and deontologists can be resolved by appeal to the idea of respect for persons. The deontologist has his notion of respect – e.g., that we not use people in certain ways – and the consequentialist has his – e.g., that the good of every person has an equal claim upon us, a claim unmediated by any notion of right or contract, so that we should do the most possible to bring about outcomes that actually advance the good of persons. For every consequentially justified act of manipulation to which the deontologist can point with alarm there is a deontologically justified act that fails to promote the well-being of some person(s) as fully as possible to which the consequentialist can point, appalled.”

    — Peter Railton, Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality

  • “If you think it’s murder, act like it.”

    — David Pearce, The Post-Darwinian Transition

  • “[I]t is difficult to believe that the way in which an agent is instrumental in the occurrence of an outcome could be more important than the nature of the outcome itself. Consider the value of an entire human life – of all the good that the life contains. Now suppose that one must choose between killing one person to save two and allowing the two to die. Is it really credible to suppose that how one acts on that single occasion matters more in moral terms than the whole of the life that will be lost if one lets the two die rather than killing the one?”

    — Jeff McMahan, Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid (January, 1993), p. 279

  • “Many believers in animal rights and the relevance of animal welfare do not critically examine their basic assumptions. [T]ypically these individuals hold two conflicting views. The first view is that animal welfare counts, and that people should treat animals as decently as possible. The second view is a presumption of human non-interference with nature, as much as possible. [T]he two views are less compatible than is commonly supposed. If we care about the welfare and rights of individual animals, we may be led to interfere with nature whenever the costs of doing so are sufficiently low.”

    — Tyler Cowen, Policing Nature (2003)

  • “Interestingly, it is not even clear that animal liberationists are motivated by ultimate concern about welfare. Consider animals in the wild, as Ng also mentions. Theirs may not be happy lives. Certainly Darwin was sufficiently persuaded by his conception of evolution that no good God could have created the scheme of things he, Darwin, discerned in nature. Perhaps animals much prefer living in domestic conditions. But this seems beside the point to hard-core animal liberationists.”

    — Joel Marks, End-state welfarism (Animal Sentience, 2016)

  • “Any sane moral theory is bound, it seems to me, to incorporate a welfarist element: other things being equal, it should be regarded as morally preferable to confer greater aggregate benefit than less.”

    — Michael Lockwood, Quality of Life and Resource Allocation (1988), p. 41

  • “One way to see the unacceptability of welfare-independent rights is to ask the question ‘why Right X?’ to a very ultimate level. If the answer is ‘Right X because Y’, then one should ask ‘Why Y?’ For example, if the answer to ‘why free speech?’ is that people enjoy free speech, it is already not welfare-independent. If the answer is free speech deters dictatorship’, then we should ask, ‘Why is it desirable to deter dictatorship?’ If one presses hard enough with such questions, most people will eventually come up with a welfare-related answer.”

    — Yew-Kwang Ng, Welfarism and Utilitarianism: A Rehabilitation (1990), p. 180

  • “It is not human life only, not human life as such, that ought to be sacred to us, but human feelings. The human capacity of suffering is what we should cause to be respected, not the mere capacity of existing.”

    — John Stuart Mill, Capital Punishment (April 21, 1868)

  • “Do we value ‘life’ even if unconscious, or do we value life only as a vehicle for consciousness? Our attitude to the doctrine of the sanctity of life very much depends on our answer to this question.”

    — Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (1990)

  • “Thomas Jefferson and George Washington owned slaves; Albert Einstein and Mohandas Gandhi were imperfect husbands and fathers. The list goes on indefinitely. We are all flawed and creatures of our times. Is it fair to judge us by the unknown standards of the future? Some of the habits of our age will doubtless be considered barbaric by later generations – perhaps for insisting that small children and even infants sleep alone instead of with their parents; or exciting nationalist passions as a means of gaining popular approval and achieving high political office; or allowing bribery and corruption as a way of life; or keeping pets; or eating animals and jailing chimpanzees; or criminalizing the use of euphoriants by adults; or allowing our children to grow up ignorant.”

    — Carl Sagan, The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark (1995), p. 247

  • “I don’t want to be Thomas Jefferson. I don’t want to be “that guy who was totally kind and smart enough to do the right thing, but lacked the will to part ways with the norms of his time even when plenty of friends and arguments were successfully showing him the way.””

    — Rob Bensinger, Revenge of the Meat People

  • “As far as I’m concerned we can remove all slave owners/segregationists from currency, buildings, days of honour and so on. The past is a cesspool of cruelty, the ringleaders of which should be held in contempt. And yes, future generations will and should do the same to us. If you want to avoid the same fate, think through how you will be viewed in the future and act on it.”

    — Robert Wiblin

  • “[T]he primary moral goal for today’s bioethics can be summarized in a single sentence. Get out of the way.”

    — Steven Pinker, The moral imperative for bioethics (The Boston Globe, August 1, 2015)

  • “There is a term in poker called “pot odds”. Meaning you make a bet having a low chance on winning, but the pot is very large, larger than your bet divided by the chances of winning. This strategy is profitable for you. The same thing applies to longevity research. If we evaluate our life highly, then it makes sense to invest in fighting aging even if the chances of your particular bet are not that high. Let’s say, you estimate the value of your life as $10 million, and the chances for success of the given life extension research project are 1%. Then it makes sense to invest up to $100,000. I estimate the value of my life as something like 10 to the power of 100 dollars. In this case it makes sense to invest all the existing money and resources in life extension. Which I’ve been doing.”

    — Maria Konovalenko

  • “Everyone thinks of changing the world, but no one thinks of changing himself.”

    — Leo Tolstoy

  • “Suppose that I do apply for a job as an aid worker. How much good will I do as an Oxfam employee? Certainly I’ll do some good. But in getting that job for Oxfam, the marginal difference that I will make not is all the good that I will do in that job at Oxfam. It’s all the good that I will do at that job at Oxfam minus all the good that the second best applicant for the job would’ve done. Because if I wasn’t in the field at all, Oxfam would have appointed the person they considered the best applicant, presumably the second best applicant. So that person would’ve done almost as much good as I would’ve.”

    — Peter Singer, How Effective Altruism Is Changing Ideas about Living Ethically (The Most You Can Do book tour at Monash University, May 24-25, 2015)

  • “A lot of people don’t think enough about choosing their career. [M]ost people spend 80,000 hours in their career, yet they don’t spend such a lot of time in their choice. You would think that it’s worth spending perhaps 1% of those hours to decide how you’re going to spend the other 99% of those 80,000 hours. 1% of 80,000 hours is 800. How many people do you think actually spend 800 hours thinking about which career they’re going to choose? That’s quite a lot of time really. So it suggests that we make this very important choice perhaps without enough reflection. People ought to reflect on which career would do the most good.”

    — Peter Singer, How Effective Altruism Is Changing Ideas about Living Ethically (The Most You Can Do book tour at Monash University, May 24-25, 2015)

  • “My students often ask me if I think their parents did wrong to pay the $44,000 per year that it costs to send them to Princeton. I respond that paying that much for a place at an elite university is not justified unless it is seen as an investment in the future that will benefit not only one’s child, but others as well. An outstanding education provides students with the skills, qualifications, and understanding to do more for the world than would otherwise be the case. It is good for the world as a whole if there are more people with these qualities. Even if going to Princeton does no more than open doors to jobs with higher salaries, that, too, is a benefit that can be spread to others, as long as after graduating you remain firm in the resolve to contribute a percentage of that salary to organizations working for the poor, and spread this idea among your highly paid colleagues. The danger, of course, is that your colleagues will instead persuade you that you can’t possibly drive anything less expensive than a BMW and that you absolutely must live in an impressively large apartment in one of the most expensive parts of town.”

    — Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty (2009), pp. 138-139

  • \\ “[T]remendous impacts are possible through speeding the pace of progress, even slightly. According to the WHO, malaria killed over 781,000 people in 2009. If current trends continue, advances in vaccines, bednets, mosquito control, and increased deployment efforts will likely eventually drive down fatalities to zero. But leaping ahead in this process by a single year could save 781,000 lives. A single day’s speedup would save 2,139 lives. Advancing the process by even 40 seconds would save a life. Then the question becomes: how many seconds can you expect to advance your field over your career?”

    — Carl Shulman, High Impact Science

  • \\ “[W]hen we ask how we can effectively do good in our careers, the key question is not how much scientific research on the whole has made the world better: it is “how do I expect the world to be different if I take up this career, rather than another one?” If Norman Borlaug had never lived his discoveries would eventually have been made by others. [W]e should think of achievements like Borlaug’s as bringing about technologies faster, rather than making them possible at all.”

    — Carl Shulman, High Impact Science

  • “There are many ways to get involved in the task of reducing suffering. It’s helpful to focus more on those that appeal to your interests and skills. Following are some broad categories:

    • Earning to give: Rather than working at an altruistic charity yourself, it can be more effective to make money elsewhere and donate large portions of it to charity. This approach works well if you especially enjoy technology, finance, or other high-earning fields and if you think there’s a low risk that peer pressure in such industries would reduce your altruistic ambitions.

    • Research: There remain many crucial questions whose answers will influence where altruists focused on reducing suffering donate their money and time. Progress on these topics not only improves your own wisdom about where to focus but can also improve the priorities of many others.

    • Movement building: Generating interest in reducing suffering effectively can multiply your impact by bringing in more minds who can contribute.

    One of the most important questions to consider is what career you should pursue, since you’ll spend a lot of your waking life at work.”

    — Brian Tomasik, A Short Introduction to Reducing Suffering (Essays on Reducing Suffering)

  • “Think of a “discovery” as an act that moves the arrival of information from a later point in time to an earlier time. The discovery’s value does not equal the value of the information discovered but rather the value of having the information available earlier than it otherwise would have been. A scientist or a mathematician may show great skill by being the first to find a solution that has eluded many others; yet if the problem would soon have been solved anyway, then the work probably has not much benefited the world [unless having a solution even slightly sooner is immensely valuable or enables further important and urgent work].”

    — Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, Chapter 15: Crunch Time (2014)

  • “[sic] Imagine a tool was invented to help a researcher to improve by just 1%. The gain would hardly be noticeable in a single individual. But if the 10 million scientists in the world all benefited from the tool the inventor would increase the rate of scientific progress by roughly the same amount as adding 100,000 new scientists. Each year the invention would amount to an indirect contribution equal to 100,000 times what the average scientist contributes.”

    — Nick Bostrom

  • “If the end doesn’t justify the means, you’re working on the wrong problem!”

    — Miracleman

  • “I’m becoming less convinced that I should try and optimise for rights above and beyond how it relates to wellbeing. If it came down to me choosing (all else being equal including flow-on effects, which doesn’t really happen in reality of course) between an animal being happy and an animal being miserable but slightly less exploited, I don’t think I could justify the latter. It seems almost forceful and exploitative itself to choose to consign some animal to misery just so they can be a bit less exploited. Surely what animals fundamentally value themselves is wellbeing, not a lack of exploitation. Humans value not being exploited because it feels bad. Non-human animals only feel bad in factory farmed conditions because such conditions objectively suck for animals. They are abused and are kept in awful conditions. I’m not convinced that ‘humane’ slaughter is possible in reality, and so I still won’t advocate for it, but I won’t pretend that there is some other thing that animals value called ‘rights’.”

    — Michael Dello-Iacovo, From utilitarian to abolitionist and back in a month (August 4, 2016)

  • “I myself regard enjoyment and suffering (defined more broadly to include milder pain and discomfort) as not only the most important, but ultimately the only important things. Freedom, knowledge, and so on are all important but only because they ultimately promote net welfare (enjoyment minus suffering). Even if they do not completely agree with this strong view regarding enjoyment and suffering, most people will accept that enjoyment and suffering are the most important considerations. Given their importance, the amount of scientific research devoted to them is dismally inadequate. The neglect is partly due to the methodological blunder, which prevents the publication of important results on things that are difficult to measure precisely.”

    — Yew-Kwang Ng, The Case for and Difficulties in Using “Demand Areas” to Measure Changes in Well-Being (1991)

  • “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light.”

    — Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chapter I (1789)

  • “Nozick’s “happiness machine” problem is a popular among academics, who generally fail to consider three things. First, who says that no one would want to be hooked up? The world is full of people who want happiness and don’t care one bit about whether it is “well deserved.” Second, those who claim that they would not agree to be hooked up may already be hooked up. After all, the deal is that you forget your previous decision. Third, no one can really answer this question because it requires them to imagine a future state in which they do not know the very thing they are currently contemplating.”

    — Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness (2005), p. 244

  • “There is a great deal of misery in the world, and many of us could easily spend our lives trying to eradicate it. [O]ne advantage of living in a world as bad as this one is that it offers the opportunity for many activities whose importance can’t be questioned. But how could the main point of human life be the elimination of evil? Misery, deprivation, and injustice prevent people from pursuing the positive goods which life is assumed to make possible. If all such goods were pointless and the only thing that really mattered was the elimination of misery, that really would be absurd.”

    — Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (1986), p. 217

  • “[O]ther things being equal it is worse to cause an animal pain than to cause an adult human being pain. An adult human being can, as it were, think his or her way around the pain to what lies beyond it in the future; an animal – like a human baby – cannot do this, so that there is nothing for the animal but the pain itself.”

    — Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (1990), pp. 292-293

  • “If animals are conscious, then they feel things, for example, pain, fear and hunger-which is intrinsically bad to feel. To inflict deliberately such experiences on an animal for no reason is either to treat the animal as a thing or else in some way to relish its suffering. And surely both those attitudes are immoral.”

    — Roger Scruton, Animal Rights and Wrongs (1998), p. 21

  • “A vacuum is a hell of a lot better than some of the stuff nature replaces it with.”

    — Tennessee Williams

  • “[I]t is true that ‘I seem to see a table’ does not entail ‘I see a table’; but ‘I seem to feel a pain’ does entail ‘I feel a pain’. So scepticism loses its force – cannot open up its characteristic gap – with regard to that which ultimately most concerns us, pleasure and pain.”

    — Galen Strawson, Freedom and Belief (1986), p. 223

  • “Ethics is founded on evidence that can’t be shared. My experience of severe pain gives me reason to believe that nihilism is false. In other words, when I am in severe pain, that pain, as it’s presented to me, gives me evidence that it’s bad in some way. I can’t share this evidence with you; you can’t feel my pain. Even if you could peer inside my head and see it, you wouldn’t be presented with it in a way that gave you evidence of its badness. But you, of course, are in the same position regarding your pain: when you are in severe pain, that pain, as it’s presented to you, provides you with evidence that it’s bad in some way. So, each of us has evidence for his or her severe pain being bad in some way. In the case of infants and nonhuman animals, the evidence is there, but the creature is too unsophisticated to recognize it as such.”

    — Stuart Rachels, Hedonic Value (PhD dissertation, University of Syracuse, 1998), p. 35

  • “When the objective self contemplates pain, it has to do so through the perspective of the sufferer, and the sufferer’s reaction is very clear. Of course he wants to be rid of this pain unreflectively – not because he thinks it would be good to reduce the amount of pain in the world. But at the same time his awareness of how bad it is doesn’t essentially involve the thought of it as his. The desire to be rid of pain has only the pain as its object. This is shown by the fact that it doesn’t even require the idea of oneself in order to make sense: if I lacked or lost the conception of myself as distinct from other possible or actual persons, I could still apprehend the badness of pain, immediately. So when I consider it from an objective standpoint, the ego doesn’t get between the pain and the objective self. My objective attitude toward pain is rightly taken over from the immediate attitude of the subject, and naturally takes the form of an evaluation of the pain itself, rather than merely a judgment of what would be reasonable for its victim to want: “This experience ought not to go on, whoever is having it.” To regard pain as impersonally bad from the objective standpoint does not involve the illegitimate suppression of an essential reference to the identity of its victim. In its most primitive form, the fact that it is mine – the concept of myself – doesn’t come into my perception of the badness of my pain.”

    — Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (1986), p. 161

  • “Suffering is suffering, [r]egardless of the being who is suffering or the source of the suffering. [I]f humans should end the needless harms they inflict upon nonhuman animals because they are harmful to the animals themselves, then we should also be concerned about other harms that nonhuman animals suffer that could be prevented, such as the many ways they are harmed in nature.”

    — Animal Ethics, Wild Animal Suffering

  • “Pain is pain, whatever the species of being that experiences it.”

    — Lori Gruen, Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A Graphic Guide (1987), p. 44

  • “When you cut your finger and you feel that terrible excruciating pain, the world disappears. The world is gone. You’ve only cut your little pinky, and its a tiny, tiny little cut that in a matter of moments will be done. But for the moment that you feel that pain, the world is gone. All you feel is that terrible, terrible pain. It’s the only universe, the only world you have, and it’s all yours, and you’re locked in, and everybody else is gone. The problem is when you feel that type of pain endlessly, and you can’t escape it. It begins to transform who you are. You begin to lose whatever special thing there is within us that makes life worth living.”

    — Keith Devries in Speciesism: The Movie (2013)

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